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Abstract
We analyze the quarterly average sale prices of new houses sold in the USA as a whole, in
the northeast, midwest, south, and west of the USA, in each of the 50 states and the District
of Columbia of the USA, to determine whether they have grown faster-than-exponential
which we take as the diagnostic of a bubble. We find that 22 states (mostly Northeast and
West) exhibit clear-cut signatures of a fast growing bubble. From the analysis of the S&P
500 Home Index, we conclude that the turning point of the bubble will probably occur
around mid-2006.
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1 Is there a real-estate bubble in the US? Lessons from the past UK bubble
In the aftermath of the burst of the “new economy” bubble in 2000, the Federal
Reserve aggressively reduced short-term rate yields in less than two years from
61/2 % to 1 % in June 2003 in an attempt to coax forth a stronger recovery of the
US economy. In March 2003, we released a paper 2 published a few months later
1 Corresponding author. Department of Earth and Space Sciences and Institute
of Geophysics and Planetary Physics, University of California, Los Angeles, CA
90095-1567, USA. Tel: +1-310-825-2863; Fax: +1-310-206-3051. E-mail address: sor-
nette@moho.ess.ucla.edu (D. Sornette)
http://www.ess.ucla.edu/faculty/sornette/
2 See, W.-X. Zhou and D. Sornette, http://arXiv.org/abs/physics/0303028
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[13] addressing the growing apprehension at the time (see for instance [1]) that this
loosening of the US monetary policy could lead to a new bubble in real estate, as
strong housing demand was being fueled by historically low mortgage rates. As of
March 2003, we concluded that, “while there is undoubtedly a strong growth rate,
there is no evidence of a super-exponential growth in the latest six years,” giving “
no evidence whatsoever of a bubble in the US real estate market” [13].
More than two years have passed. During that period, the historically low Fed rate
of 1% remained stable from June 2003 to June 2004. Since June 2004, the Fed
(specifically, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)) has increased its dis-
count rate by increments of 0.25% at each of its successive meetings (the FOMC
holds 8 meetings per year): at the time of writing (end of May 2005), the last 0.25%
increase occurred on May 3rd, 2005 to yield a short-term rate of 3%, the next meet-
ing of the FOMC being scheduled on 29/30 June 2005 3 . While the short-term
interest rates are following a steady upward trend of 2% per year since June 2004,
long-term rates have not followed, some going down while other long-term rates
increasing only slightly. Thus, long-term mortgage interest rates have remained
extremely low by historical standard. The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO), the government unit tasked with regulating Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac 4 , recently published a research paper 5 stating that “The housing
market achieved record levels of activity and contributed significantly to the eco-
nomic recovery ... Falling mortgage rates stimulated housing starts and sales, and
many refinancing borrowers took out loans that were larger than those they paid
off, providing additional funds for consumption expenditures... According to Fred-
die Mac, homeowners who refinanced in 2003 converted almost $139 billion in
home equity into cash, up from $105 billion in 2002.” This has led to renewed
worries that a real-estate bubble is on its way.
The purpose of this paper is to revisit this question, using the more than two addi-
tional years of data since our previous analysis [13]. As explained in our previous
paper on real-estate bubbles [13], our analysis relies on a general theory of finan-
cial crashes and of stock market instabilities developed in a series of works (see
[9,3,5,2,8,6] and references therein). The main ingredient of the theory is the ex-
istence of positive feedbacks in stock markets as well as in the economy. Positive
feedbacks, i.e., self-reinforcement, refer to the fact that, conditioned on the obser-
vation that the market has recently moved up (respectively down), this makes it
more probable to keep it moving up (respectively down), so that a large cumulative
move may ensue. The concept of “positive feedbacks” has a long history in eco-
3 Federal Open Market Committee, http://www.federalreserve.gov/FOMC/#calendars
4 Fannie Mae (resp. Freddie Mac) is a stockholder-owned corporation chartered by the
Federal Government in 1938 (resp. by Congress in 1970) to keep money flowing to mort-
gage lenders in support of homeownership and rental housing.
5 Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), Mortgage markets
and the enterprises (October 2004), prepared by V.L. Smith and L.R. Bowes
(http://www.ofheo.gov/Research.asp)
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nomics. It can occur for instance in the form of “increasing returns”– which says
that goods become cheaper the more of them are produced (and the closely related
idea that some products, like fax machines, become more useful the more people
use them). Positive feedbacks, when unchecked, can produce runaways until the
deviation from equilibrium is so large that other effects can be abruptly triggered
and lead to rupture or crashes. Alternatively, it can give prolonged depressive bear-
ish markets. There are many mechanisms leading to positive feedbacks including
investors’ over-confidence, imitative behavior and herding between investors, refi-
nancing releasing new cash re-invested in houses, lower requirement margins due
to uprising prices, and so on. Such positive feedbacks provide the fuel for the de-
velopment of speculative bubbles, by the mechanism of cooperativity, that is, the
interactions and imitation between investors may lead to collective behaviors sim-
ilar to crowd phenomena. Different types of collective regimes are separated by
so-called critical points which, in physics, are widely considered to be one of the
most interesting properties of complex systems. A system goes critical when lo-
cal influences propagate over long distances and the average state of the system
becomes exquisitely sensitive to a small perturbation, i.e. different parts of the sys-
tem become highly correlated. Another characteristic is that critical systems are
self-similar across scales: at the critical point, an ocean of traders who are mostly
bearish may have within it several continents of traders who are mostly bullish, each
of which in turns surrounds seas of bearish traders with islands of bullish traders;
the progression continues all the way down to the smallest possible scale: a single
trader [12]. Intuitively speaking, critical self-similarity is why local imitation cas-
cades through the scales into global coordination. Critical points are described in
mathematical parlance as singularities associated with bifurcation and catastrophe
theory. At critical points, scale invariance holds and its signature is the power law
behavior of observables.
Mathematically, these ideas are captured by the power law
ln[p(t)] = A +B(tc − t)
m , (1)
where p(t) is the house price or index, tc is an estimate of the end of a bubble so
that t < tc and A,B,m are coefficients. If the exponent m is negative, ln[p(t)] is
singular when t → t−c and B > 0 ensuring that ln[p(t)] increases. If 0 < m < 1,
ln[p(t)] is finite but its first derivative d ln[p(t)]/dt is singular at tc and B < 0
ensuring that ln[p(t)] increases. Extension of this power law (1) takes the form of
log-periodic power law (LPPL) for the logarithm of the price
ln[p(t)] = A+B(tc − t)
m + C(tc − t)
m cos [ω log(tc − t)− φ] , (2)
where φ is a phase constant and ω is the angular log-frequency. This first version
(2) amounts to assume that the potential correction or crash at the end of the bubble
is proportional to the total price [3]. In contrast, a second version assumes that the
potential correction or crash at the end of the bubble is proportional to the bubble
part of the total price, that is to the total price minus the fundamental price [3]. This
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gives the following price evolution:
p(t) = A +B(tc − t)
m + C(tc − t)
m cos [ω log(tc − t)− φ] . (3)
As explained in [13,6], we diagnose a bubble using these models by demonstrat-
ing a faster-than-exponential increase of p(t), possibly decorated by log-periodic
oscillations.
Before presenting the result of our analysis using these models on the US real-
estate bubble, it is appropriate to discuss how our detection of a bubble in the UK
real-estate market fared since March 2003. In [13], we reported “unmistakable sig-
natures (log-periodicity and power law super-exponential acceleration) of a strong
unsustainable bubble” for the UK real-estate market. We identified two potential
turning points in the UK bubble reported in Tables 2 and 3 of [13]: end of 2003 and
mid-2004. The former (resp. later) was based on the use of formula (2) (resp. (3)).
These predictions were performed in Feb. 2003 (again our paper was released in
early March 2003 on an electronic archive 6 ). We stress that these turning points
can be either crashes or changes of regimes according to the theory coupling ratio-
nal expectation bubbles with collective herding behavior described in [2,5,11,4]. In
other words, the theory describes bubbles and their end but not the crash itself: the
end of a bubble is the most probable time for a crash, but a crash can occur earlier
(with low probability) or not at all; the possibility that no crash occurs is necessary
for the bubble to exist, otherwise, rational investors would anticipate the crash and,
by backward reasoning, would make it impossible to develop.
Figure 1 plots the UK Halifax house price index (HPI) 7 from 1993 to April 2005
(the latest available quote at the time of writing). The two groups of vertical lines
correspond to the two predicted turning points mentioned above. The first set of
predicted turning points (dashed lines in Figure 1) anticipated by half-a-year the
turning point which occurred mid-2004 as predicted by the second set.
Our analysis presented below uses three data sets: (1) the regional data (Northeast,
Midwest, west, south and USA as a whole) of the quarterly average sale prices of
new houses up to the fourth quarter of 2004 (the latest data available); (2) the house
6 W.-X. Zhou and D. Sornette, http://arXiv.org/abs/physics/0303028
7 The Halifax house price index has been used extensively by government de-
partments, the media and businesses as an authoritative indicator of house price
movements in the United Kingdom. This index is based on the largest sample
of housing data and provides the longest unbroken series of any similar UK in-
dex. The monthly house price index data are retrieved from the web site of HBOS
http://www.hbosplc.com/view/housepriceindex/housepriceindex.asp..
The six time series are the following. AllMon: All Houses (All Buyers); AllMonSA: All
Houses (All Buyers) (seasonally adjusted); Existing: Existing Houses (All Buyers); New:
New Houses (All Buyers); FOO: Former Owner Occupiers (All Houses); FTB: First Time
Buyers (All Houses).
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price index of individual states (50 states + DC), up to Q1 of 2005, quarterly data;
and (3) daily data of the S&P 500 Home Index, up to May 6, 2005. We first present
in section 2 a broad-brush analysis using the exponential versus power law models
of house price appreciation for the whole continental US and then by regions. We
then turn to a state-by-state analysis which leads to a partition into three classes: (i)
non-bubbling states, (ii) recent-bubbling states and (iii) clearly-bubbling states. For
the states for which a bubble seems to be clearly established according to our crite-
rion, we provide a first estimation of the critical time of the end of the bubble. We
then turn to the more elaborate LPPL models (2) and (3) and a nonlinear extension,
using the daily data of the S&P 500 Home Index up to May 6, 2005.
2 Evidence of a US real-estate bubble by faster-than-exponential growth
Figures 2 show the quarterly average sale prices of new houses sold in all the states
of the USA as well as in the four main regions, Northeast, Midwest, South and
West, from 1993 to the fourth quarter of 2004 as a function of time t. The smooth
curve is the power-law fit (1) to the data. Except for the midwest and south re-
gions, one can observe a strong upward curvature in these linear-logarithmic plots,
which characterize a faster-than-exponential price growth (recall that an exponen-
tial growth would qualify as a straight line in such linear-logarithmic plots). The
existence of a strong upward curvature characterizing a faster-than-exponential
growth is quantified by the relatively small values of the exponent m (= 0.55 for
all states, = 0.64 for the Northeast region, = 0.18 for the West region).
To have a closer look, we examined quarterly data of House Price Index (HPI) for
each individual state. Rather than following a formal procedure and developing so-
phisticated statistical tests, the obvious differences between the price trajectories
in the different states led us to prefer a more intuitive approach consisting of clas-
sifying the different states according to how strongly they depart from a steady
exponential growth. We found three families, shown in figures 3, 4 and 5. Figure
3 shows the quarterly HPI in the 21 states which have an approximately constant
exponential growth, qualified by a linear trend in a linear-logarithmic scale. The
thick straight line at the bottom of the figure is the average over all 21 states cor-
responding to an annual growth rate of 4.6% over the last 13 years (we did not use
the data prior to 1992 to avoid contamination by the turning point of the previous
bubble in 1991). Figure 4 shows the quarterly HPI in the 8 states exhibiting a re-
cent upward acceleration following an approximately constant exponential growth
rate. Figure 5 shows the quarterly HPI in the 22 states exhibiting a clear upward
faster-than-exponential growth. These 22 states thus exhibit the hallmark of a real-
estate bubble. Figure 6 provides a geographical synopsis of this classification in
three families: the first family of figure 3 is green, the second family of figure 4 is
magenta, and the third family of figure 5 is red. As often discussed by commen-
tators, prices have accelerated mostly to the Northeast and West regions, which is
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consistent with Fig. 2.
Consider the third family of 22 states where we diagnose a bubble, as shown in
figure 5. Can a power law fit with (1) reveal the end of the bubble? Such turning
point is in principle measured by the time tc in expression (1), which gives the time
at which the bubble should end. In order to get less noisy data, we averaged over
the 22 price trajectories of figure 5 and then fitted the obtained average with (1)
(with the modification that tc − t is replaced by |tc − t| to allow for a more robust
estimation) over a time interval from tstart to the last available data point (2005Q1).
Figure 7 shows the obtained critical time tc and exponent m as a function of tstart.
Varying tstart allows us to test for sensitivity with respect to the different time peri-
ods and assess the robustness of the results. Not surprisingly, we find that the fitted
tc is close to the last data points for some tstart, a result which has been found to
systematically characterize power law behaviors [6]. Therefore, the power law fit is
not very reliable to determine the end of the real-estate bubble. However, the rela-
tive stability of m in the range 0.1− 0.5 as a function of tstart, which characterizes
a faster-than-exponential growth, indicates that the simple power law (1) is already
a good model.
3 Extension to the LPPL model and discussion
The previous tests performed in [9,3,5,2,8,6] (and references therein) show that the
problem with the too-large sensitivity of tc in the simple power law model with
respect to the few last data points are alleviated by using the more sophisticated
LPPL models (2) and (3). Here, we use both LPPL models (2) and (3) as well as the
so-called 2nd-order Landau LPPL introduced in [7] 8 . In a nutshell, the 2nd-order
Landau LPPL extends the LPPL model by allowing for a first nonlinear correction
which amounts to combining two log-frequencies ω0 (close to tc) and ω∞ (far from
tc).
We fit the daily data of the S&P 500 Home Index to the LPPL and 2nd-order Landau
LPPL models in a time interval from tstart to the last available data point (April
2005). Figure 8 presents the dependence of ω for the LPPL model and of ω0 for
the 2nd-order Landau LPPL model as a function of tstart. We find ω ≈ 10 and ω0
oscillating between ω ≈ 10 and ω/2, as we expect from the generic existence of
harmonics (see our previous extended discussions in [10,14]). The stability of ω0
and the compatibility between the two descriptions is a signature of the robustness
of the signal. Figure 9 shows the predicted critical time tc as a function of tstart
obtained from the fits with the LPPL and the 2nd-order Landau LPPL models. The
large spreads of values for tstart earlier than 1993 reflects the fact that the bubble
8 See also http://www.ess.ucla.edu/faculty/sornette/prediction/index.asp#prediction for a
recent application to the US stock market
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has really started only after 1993.
We observe a good stability of the predicted tc ≈ mid-2006 for the two LPPL
models (2) and (3). The spread of tc is larger for the second-order LPPL fits but
brackets mid-2006. As mentioned before, the power law fits are not reliable. We
conclude that the turning point of the bubble will probably occur around mid-2006.
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Fig. 1. Plot of the UK Halifax house price indices from 1993 to April 2005 (the latest
available quote at the time of writing). The two groups of vertical lines correspond to the
two predicted turning points reported in Tables 2 and 3 of [13]: end of 2003 and mid-2004.
The former (resp. later) was based on the use of formula (2) (resp. (3)). These predictions
were performed in Feb, 2003.
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Fig. 2. Quarterly average sale prices of new houses sold in all the states of the USA and
by regions (Northeast, Midwest, South and West) from 1993 to the first quarter of 2005
as a function of time t. The smooth lines are the power-law fits (1) to the five data sets.
The values of fitted parameters for the West are tc = 2008.3, m = 0.18, A = 15.48,
and B = −2.16 with the r.m.s. of the fit residuals being 0.0275. The values of the fitted
parameters for USA are tc = 2006.0, m = 0.55, A = 12.75, and B = −0.212 with the
r.m.s. of the fit residuals being 0.0174. The values of fitted parameters for the Northeast are
tc = 2005.2, m = 0.64, A = 12.92, and B = −0.154 with the r.m.s. of the fit residuals
being 0.0485. The values of fitted parameters for the South are tc = 2005.2, m = 0.78,
A = 12.37, and B = −0.092 with the r.m.s. of the fit residuals being 0.0215. The values of
fitted parameters for the Midwest are tc = 2005.2, m = 0.84, A = 12.40, and B = −0.066
with the r.m.s. of the fit residuals being 0.0308.
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Fig. 3. (Color online) Quarterly HPI in the 21 states which have an approximately con-
stant exponential growth, qualified by a linear trend in a linear-logarithmic scale. The thick
straight line at the bottom of the figure is the average over all 21 states corresponding to an
annual growth rate of 4.6% over the last 13 years. The corresponding states are given in the
legend. Note that Colorado seems to be on a faster trend.
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Fig. 4. (Color online) Quarterly HPI in the 8 states exhibiting a recent upward acceleration
following an approximately constant exponential growth rate. The corresponding states are
given in the legend.
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Fig. 5. (Color online) Quarterly average HPI in the 21 states and in the District of Columbia
(DC) exhibiting a clear upward faster-than-exponential growth. For better representation,
we have normalized the house price indices for the second quarter of 1992 to 100 in all 22
cases. The corresponding states are given in the legend.
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Fig. 6. Geographical synopsis of the classification in three families: the first family of
non-bubbling states of figure 3 in green, the second family of recently-bubbling states in
figure 4 in magenta and the third family of clearly bubbling states in figure 5 in red. Hawaii
and Alaska, both in red, are not drawn here.
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Fig. 7. Critical time tc and exponent m as a function of tstart, obtained by fitting with the
power law (1) (with the modification that tc − t is replaced by |tc − t| to allow for a more
robust estimation) the price trajectory obtained by averaging over the 22 states of figure 5.
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Fig. 8. Dependence of ω for the LPPL model and of ω0 for the 2nd-order Landau LPPL
model as a function of tstart obtained by fitting the S&P 500 Home Index up to May 6,
2005.
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Fig. 9. Predicted critical time tc as a function of tstart obtained from the fits with the LPPL
and the 2nd-order Landau LPPL models as in figure 8.
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